Institutional moral hazard in the multi-tiered regulation of unemployment and social assistance benefits
"This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral haz...
Main Authors: | Vandenbroucke, Frank, Luigies, Chris |
---|---|
Institution: | ETUI-European Trade Union Institute |
Format: | TEXT |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Brussels
2016
CEPS |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.labourline.org/KENTIKA-19104999124919221719-institutional-moral-hazard-in-.htm |
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