Memorandum on the Beveridge Report

1943-02 1943 1940s 28 pages of the Government with regard to the Report. The reader will find them set out in the appendix. Suffice it to say that the argument that Sir William Beveridge proposed 22 changes, the Government has accepted 16, is considering 5 and has only decisively rejected 1, is not...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Beveridge, William Henry Beveridge, Baron, 1879-1963 (contributor)
Institution:MCR - The Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick
Language:English
English
Published: London : Communist Party of Great Britain February 1943
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Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10796/C398CB05-68F2-441D-8F5E-3EA4A983F708
http://hdl.handle.net/10796/EDF112E2-45E0-4D77-A533-613741F910EB
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Summary:1943-02 1943 1940s 28 pages of the Government with regard to the Report. The reader will find them set out in the appendix. Suffice it to say that the argument that Sir William Beveridge proposed 22 changes, the Government has accepted 16, is considering 5 and has only decisively rejected 1, is not true. In any case, not all the changes proposed by Beveridge were of equal weight — some of them were of a purely administrative character. The central feature of the Report, however, a uniform level of benefits for sickness, unemployment, and (after a period) for old age pensions, based on a subsistence scale, guaranteed to give freedom from physical want, is rejected. That is a serious blow to the Report. But the last word is still to be spoken. The Report, together with progressive amendments, can still be placed on the statute book if a united Labour Movement strives for it in the right way. We stress in the right way, for the Beveridge report cannot be obtained unless we win the war, and the war cannot be won without the massive invasion of Western Europe by the Western Allies. The Labour Movement must make its major concern the opening of the Western Offensive against the Axis, and its fullest support once it is opened. The more it comes forward in the public estimation as the main win-the-war force in Britain, the easier it will be to break reactionary resistance to the Beveridge Report. All alluring short cuts — the breaking of the political truce, Labour leaving the Government, etc. — will strengthen the forces which are hindering the Second Front and obstructing the Beveridge Report. The way forward for Labour is to combine the drive for a more vigorous win-the-war policy with the drive for reconstruction, never failing to lay predominant weight on the former aim. On the basis of this policy, Labour could win the leadership of Britain in war and in peace. It would achieve the full Beveridge Report — and a great deal more. J.R. CAMPBELL. 15X/2/103/272
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