Memorandum on social insurance and allied services in their bearing on neurotic disorder
1943 1943 1940s 19 pages 8 specifically for that purpose should not be included except in so far as they also further the main purpose of preventing want. Any social security scheme "based on a diagnosis of want" would have these effects — but only in so far as they are r...
| Institution: | MCR - The Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick |
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| Language: | English English |
| Published: |
[1943?]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10796/699BE0EA-2DC8-4E1B-8CDC-DC6F9C2E9A86 http://hdl.handle.net/10796/0253BD39-5559-4DC1-8EDB-E0C9653F65BF |
| Summary: | 1943
1943
1940s
19 pages
8 specifically for that purpose should not be included except in so far as they also further the main purpose of preventing want. Any social security scheme "based on a diagnosis of want" would have these effects — but only in so far as they are relevant. The old age proposals contravene this last principle ; in its concern over the need to encourage work among the aged, or for the sake of economy, the scheme scarcely provides adequately for their want, its main objective. (2) Benefit Rates. The Report recognizes that these must be above subsistence level and related to individual needs, and it is for others to consider whether they do in fact achieve this. (a) The general principle of a flat rate of benefit seems proper in view of the above general principles (I (d)). (b) Legislation fixing minimum wages at some level above these rates should be a fundamental assumption of the scheme — both to ensure the abolition of want, and to prevent interference with the incentive to work. (c) The rent problem. — This involves a social problem as large as children's allowances, but is similarly relevant to the Beveridge Report ; some greater rent equalization may be a desirable objective apart from these proposals, but if this scheme is to provide for needs it should cover the home and so the full rent. However, whatever means be employed to meet this difficulty, the fear of being unable to pay the rent is a cause of anxiety and neurosis which should be obviated. (d) Only for workmen's injury pensions after 13 weeks' disability does the report suggest a benefit rate than the flat one fixed at subsistence level. The extra benefit proposed is slight, but it is either too slight to be worth introducing or it is likely to have disadvantages. Such a change should not occur before the time limit for the institution of training schemes, etc., i.e. six months. Probably the present situation where workmen's accidents are an employer's liability, while sickness is nobody's, tends to fix a prevalent idea that such accidents should not cause financial loss, while other sickness may. It introduces an undesirable distinction among illnesses, which may tend to focus the patient's attention on the possible financial gain from certain types of disability. In dealing with the insured person we should only consider who has been hurt, how badly and what can be done for him, and not link this to the question of who is to carry responsibility. There is perhaps another point of view ; modern industry involves risk, and those who suffer by these risks should be offered somewhat better treatment than when "ordinary" disability occurs. This does not seem to be the correct way of approaching the matter. Extra money might reasonably be given as "danger pay" and for any permanent disability (partial or complete) which might develop, but to give those who have suffered an industrial injury any preferential pay during their period of treatment, before disability is known to be permanent, would tend to favour the "compensation" attitude which it is hoped the comprehensive approach in the Beveridge proposals should remove. The same time-limit should operate as for other decisions about permanent benefit or training, e.g. six months.
292/847/2/174 |
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| Physical Description: | TEXT |