Memorandum on social insurance and allied services in their bearing on neurotic disorder

1943 1943 1940s 19 pages 11 tation if possible. If they refuse co-operation this should be taken as a reflection on the efficiency of the service, and not as a reason for compulsion. Refusal to co-operate should call for review by a board of Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Health officials, inclu...

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Bibliographic Details
Institution:MCR - The Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick
Language:English
English
Published: [1943?]
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10796/1718D0BE-49F2-4C07-9000-7EBE17AEF625
http://hdl.handle.net/10796/BA8DF9BF-B4D0-4B14-9010-391897A3EF28
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Summary:1943 1943 1940s 19 pages 11 tation if possible. If they refuse co-operation this should be taken as a reflection on the efficiency of the service, and not as a reason for compulsion. Refusal to co-operate should call for review by a board of Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Health officials, including a psychiatrist ; the right of the insured person to refuse help should be safeguarded, and only rarely should stoppage of payments, or more rarely still, legal action be resorted to. In the last, rare instance, continuity of psychiatric attention would be desirable. (m) The entitlement of all classes contributing to equal benefits — This is one of the stated aims, but Class II — the non-employees who are gainfully occupied — are left out on this score for reasons of administrative simplicity ; perhaps they should be thus excluded from unemployment benefit (unless the unemployment becomes prolonged) as in the proposals, since their being in Class II implies their preferring to take this risk. But the same argument does not hold for disability benefit and industrial pension, and this should be available for them as for all others if the scheme is to be comprehensive and fair, and neurotic attitudes of resentment, depression and anxiety are not to develop. (3) Insurance Contributory Payments. (The distribution of the cost of the scheme.) There is little to comment upon here except — (a) The merit adjustment for employer's payments (see later) which needs safeguarding so that accident-prone workers will not be discriminated against (it might be desirable to facilitate their removal from such trades, but this should be under State supervision), and so that there will not be excessive concentration on a search for the minor symptoms of industrial poisoning which might induce psychiatric disabilities (see under Section 4 below). It should be so framed that the existence of adequate safety measures conditions the merit rating (e.g. via Factory Inspector's certification). (b) The treatment of those who have already contributed to pension and insurance schemes which the proposals would supersede. It seems reasonable that all these should be dealt with similarly — whether for old age, unemployment, etc. To avoid discrediting previous thrift and setting up unhealthy attitudes of resentment among this thrifty section of the population, the following procedure might be adopted : The present surrender value of their insurances should be assessed, and these then converted into either — (1) Reductions of the first five years' payments, while the general level of such payments should be raised to cover a part of the transition costs. (2) Conversion, after surrender of a percentage to the S.S. fund, into voluntary insurances. (c) Supervision of payments by Class II and others which are not collected at source. It might jeopardize the general attitude to the scheme if any weekly collectors were appointed to cover this danger. Rather special procedures should be adopted to ensure some deduction at source — e.g. a system of yearly licences for traders which would entail supervising their general 292/847/2/174
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