The dilemna of delegating search: budgeting in public employment services
"The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Institution: | ETUI-European Trade Union Institute |
| Format: | TEXT |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Bonn
2010
IZA |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.labourline.org/KENTIKA-19183773124919019559-The-dilemna-of-delegating-sear.htm |
| Summary: | "The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates. " |
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| Physical Description: | 22 p. Digital |